hostapd: Security fix for CVE-2023-52160

CVE-2023-52160:
The implementation of PEAP in wpa_supplicant through 2.10 allows
authentication bypass. For a successful attack, wpa_supplicant must be
configured to not verify the network's TLS certificate during Phase 1
authentication, and an eap_peap_decrypt vulnerability can then be abused
to skip Phase 2 authentication. The attack vector is sending an EAP-TLV
Success packet instead of starting Phase 2. This allows an adversary to
impersonate Enterprise Wi-Fi networks.

Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52160

Patch from:
https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c

Signed-off-by: Yi Zhao <yi.zhao@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>

2 files changed, 199 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2023-52160.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2023-52160.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7f46ea84c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/CVE-2023-52160.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+From 6c81c2d98dc5a8a6296820bd9f083faae2c788c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements
+
+The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2
+authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated
+during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP
+specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front
+is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than
+the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when
+unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed
+devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the
+user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped.
+
+Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2
+authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session
+resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been
+configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed
+authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more
+strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability
+issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS
+session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues.
+
+Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1
+configuration parameter option:
+'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
+tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
+ * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
+ * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
+   (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
+   not used (default)
+ * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+
+CVE: CVE-2023-52160
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+[https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c]
+
+Signed-off-by: Yi Zhao <yi.zhao@windriver.com>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_config.h     |  8 +++++++
+ src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c       | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c |  6 ++++++
+ src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h |  5 +++++
+ 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
+index 3238f74..047eec2 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
+@@ -469,6 +469,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config {
+         * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
+         * 2 = require cryptobinding
+         *
++        * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
++        * tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
++        * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
++        * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
++        *  (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
++        *  not used (default)
++        * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
++        *
+         * EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and
+         * uuid=Device_UUID
+         *
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
+index 12e30df..6080697 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data {
+        u8 cmk[20];
+        int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP)
+                  * is enabled. */
++       enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth;
+ };
+ 
+ 
+@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct eap_peap_data *data,
+                wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding");
+        }
+ 
++       if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) {
++               data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH;
++               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++                          "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication");
++       } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) {
++               data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
++               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++                          "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection");
++       } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) {
++               data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS;
++               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++                          "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases");
++       }
+ #ifdef EAP_TNC
+        if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) {
+                data->soh = 2;
+@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
+        data->force_peap_version = -1;
+        data->peap_outer_success = 2;
+        data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING;
++       data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
+ 
+        if (config && config->phase1)
+                eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1);
+@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobinding(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm,
++                                  struct eap_peap_data *data)
++{
++       if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS ||
++            (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL &&
++             !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
++             !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) ||
++            data->phase2_eap_started) &&
++           !data->phase2_eap_success)
++               return false;
++       return true;
++}
++
++
+ /**
+  * eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response
+  * @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init()
+@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data,
+                                           " - force failed Phase 2");
+                                resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
+                                ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
++                       } else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
++                               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
++                                          "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed");
++                               resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
++                               ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
+                        } else {
+                                resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS;
+                                ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;
+@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req:
+                        /* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate
+                         * shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has
+                         * been completed. */
+-                       if (data->phase2_eap_started &&
+-                           !data->phase2_eap_success) {
++                       if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
+                                wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 "
+                                           "Success used to indicate success, "
+                                           "but Phase 2 EAP was not yet "
+@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
+ {
+        struct eap_peap_data *data = priv;
++
+        return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
+-               data->phase2_success;
++               data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
+index c1837db..a53eeb1 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
+@@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(struct eap_sm *sm,
+ 
+        sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK);
+ 
++       if (!phase2)
++               data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert ||
++                       params->client_cert_blob ||
++                       params->private_key ||
++                       params->private_key_blob;
++
+        return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
+index 9ac0012..3348634 100644
+--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
+@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data {
+         * tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used
+         */
+        int tls_v13;
++
++       /**
++        * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured
++        */
++       bool client_cert_conf;
+ };
+ 
+ 
+-- 
+2.25.1
+
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.10.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.10.bb
index a745e7a404..5ef6ac64b2 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.10.bb
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.10.bb
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ SRC_URI = " \
     file://CVE-2024-3596_08.patch \
     file://0001-SAE-Check-for-invalid-Rejected-Groups-element-length.patch \
     file://0003-SAE-Reject-invalid-Rejected-Groups-element-in-the-pa.patch \
+    file://CVE-2023-52160.patch \
 "