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authorSoumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>2025-01-10 13:17:55 +0000
committerArmin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>2025-01-22 19:20:09 -0500
commite13c721bed30ec9ab67a6c802314b3fb2cd97831 (patch)
treec735d5063d6409990e8bdcc6dbd7d952709289eb /meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-django
parent59ebd5b114dc6215e24a48991bd28f7320b7a055 (diff)
downloadmeta-openembedded-e13c721bed30ec9ab67a6c802314b3fb2cd97831.tar.gz
python3-django: Fix CVE-2023-23969
In Django 3.2 before 3.2.17, 4.0 before 4.0.9, and 4.1 before 4.1.6, the parsed values of Accept-Language headers are cached in order to avoid repetitive parsing. This leads to a potential denial-of-service vector via excessive memory usage if the raw value of Accept-Language headers is very large. References: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23969 Upstream-patch: https://github.com/django/django/commit/c7e0151fdf33e1b11d488b6f67b94fdf3a30614a Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-django')
-rw-r--r--meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-django/CVE-2023-23969.patch108
1 files changed, 108 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-django/CVE-2023-23969.patch b/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-django/CVE-2023-23969.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..42e25ad3be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-python/recipes-devtools/python/python3-django/CVE-2023-23969.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
1From c7e0151fdf33e1b11d488b6f67b94fdf3a30614a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Nick Pope <nick@nickpope.me.uk>
3Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 12:21:48 +0100
4Subject: [PATCH] [3.2.x] Fixed CVE-2023-23969 -- Prevented DoS with
5 pathological values for Accept-Language.
6
7The parsed values of Accept-Language headers are cached in order to
8avoid repetitive parsing. This leads to a potential denial-of-service
9vector via excessive memory usage if the raw value of Accept-Language
10headers is very large.
11
12Accept-Language headers are now limited to a maximum length in order
13to avoid this issue.
14
15CVE: CVE-2023-23969
16
17Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/django/django/commit/c7e0151fdf33e1b11d488b6f67b94fdf3a30614a]
18
19Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
20---
21 django/utils/translation/trans_real.py | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
22 tests/i18n/tests.py | 12 +++++++++++
23 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
24
25diff --git a/django/utils/translation/trans_real.py b/django/utils/translation/trans_real.py
26index 486b2b2..7f658cf 100644
27--- a/django/utils/translation/trans_real.py
28+++ b/django/utils/translation/trans_real.py
29@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ _default = None
30 # magic gettext number to separate context from message
31 CONTEXT_SEPARATOR = "\x04"
32
33+# Maximum number of characters that will be parsed from the Accept-Language
34+# header to prevent possible denial of service or memory exhaustion attacks.
35+ACCEPT_LANGUAGE_HEADER_MAX_LENGTH = 500
36+
37 # Format of Accept-Language header values. From RFC 2616, section 14.4 and 3.9
38 # and RFC 3066, section 2.1
39 accept_language_re = re.compile(r'''
40@@ -560,7 +564,7 @@ def get_language_from_request(request, check_path=False):
41
42
43 @functools.lru_cache(maxsize=1000)
44-def parse_accept_lang_header(lang_string):
45+def _parse_accept_lang_header(lang_string):
46 """
47 Parse the lang_string, which is the body of an HTTP Accept-Language
48 header, and return a tuple of (lang, q-value), ordered by 'q' values.
49@@ -582,3 +586,27 @@ def parse_accept_lang_header(lang_string):
50 result.append((lang, priority))
51 result.sort(key=lambda k: k[1], reverse=True)
52 return tuple(result)
53+
54+
55+def parse_accept_lang_header(lang_string):
56+ """
57+ Parse the value of the Accept-Language header up to a maximum length.
58+
59+ The value of the header is truncated to a maximum length to avoid potential
60+ denial of service and memory exhaustion attacks. Excessive memory could be
61+ used if the raw value is very large as it would be cached due to the use of
62+ `functools.lru_cache()` to avoid repetitive parsing of common header values.
63+ """
64+ # If the header value doesn't exceed the maximum allowed length, parse it.
65+ if len(lang_string) <= ACCEPT_LANGUAGE_HEADER_MAX_LENGTH:
66+ return _parse_accept_lang_header(lang_string)
67+
68+ # If there is at least one comma in the value, parse up to the last comma,
69+ # skipping any truncated parts at the end of the header value.
70+ index = lang_string.rfind(",", 0, ACCEPT_LANGUAGE_HEADER_MAX_LENGTH)
71+ if index > 0:
72+ return _parse_accept_lang_header(lang_string[:index])
73+
74+ # Don't attempt to parse if there is only one language-range value which is
75+ # longer than the maximum allowed length and so truncated.
76+ return ()
77diff --git a/tests/i18n/tests.py b/tests/i18n/tests.py
78index 7381cb9..6efc3a5 100644
79--- a/tests/i18n/tests.py
80+++ b/tests/i18n/tests.py
81@@ -1282,6 +1282,14 @@ class MiscTests(SimpleTestCase):
82 ('de;q=0.', [('de', 0.0)]),
83 ('en; q=1,', [('en', 1.0)]),
84 ('en; q=1.0, * ; q=0.5', [('en', 1.0), ('*', 0.5)]),
85+ (
86+ 'en' + '-x' * 20,
87+ [('en-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x', 1.0)],
88+ ),
89+ (
90+ ', '.join(['en; q=1.0'] * 20),
91+ [('en', 1.0)] * 20,
92+ ),
93 # Bad headers
94 ('en-gb;q=1.0000', []),
95 ('en;q=0.1234', []),
96@@ -1297,6 +1305,10 @@ class MiscTests(SimpleTestCase):
97 ('12-345', []),
98 ('', []),
99 ('en;q=1e0', []),
100+ # Invalid as language-range value too long.
101+ ('xxxxxxxx' + '-xxxxxxxx' * 500, []),
102+ # Header value too long, only parse up to limit.
103+ (', '.join(['en; q=1.0'] * 500), [('en', 1.0)] * 45),
104 ]
105 for value, expected in tests:
106 with self.subTest(value=value):
107--
1082.40.0