2 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..522fc394b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+hostapd-2.6: Fix CVE-2018-14526
+
+[No upstream tracking] -- https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt
+
+wpa: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
+
+Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant
+processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted
+flag set, but not the MIC flag.
+
+When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but
+not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying
+the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when
+negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that
+unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary
+could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information
+in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key).
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c?id=3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961]
+CVE: CVE-2018-14526
+Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 3c47879..6bdf923 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
+
+        if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) &&
+            (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) {
++               /*
++                * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity
++                * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not
++                * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0
++                * which is the case in this code branch.
++                */
++               if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
++                       wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++                               "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data");
++                       goto out;
++               }
+                if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data,
+                                                    &key_data_len))
+                        goto out;
diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb
index 250add8753..42aae4279c 100644
--- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb
+++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = " \
     file://0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch \
     file://0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch \
     file://0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch \
+    file://hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch \
 "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "eaa56dce9bd8f1d195eb62596eab34c7"