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-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2022-40617.patch210
-rw-r--r--meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb1
2 files changed, 211 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2022-40617.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2022-40617.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..66e5047125
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/files/CVE-2022-40617.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
1From 66d3b2e0e596a6eac1ebcd15c83a8d9368fe7b34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
3Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 15:37:43 +0200
4Subject: [PATCH] credential-manager: Do online revocation checks only after
5 basic trust chain validation
6
7This avoids querying URLs of potentially untrusted certificates, e.g. if
8an attacker sends a specially crafted end-entity and intermediate CA
9certificate with a CDP that points to a server that completes the
10TCP handshake but then does not send any further data, which will block
11the fetcher thread (depending on the plugin) for as long as the default
12timeout for TCP. Doing that multiple times will block all worker threads,
13leading to a DoS attack.
14
15The logging during the certificate verification obviously changes. The
16following example shows the output of `pki --verify` for the current
17strongswan.org certificate:
18
19new:
20
21 using certificate "CN=www.strongswan.org"
22 using trusted intermediate ca certificate "C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3"
23 using trusted ca certificate "C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1"
24 reached self-signed root ca with a path length of 1
25checking certificate status of "CN=www.strongswan.org"
26 requesting ocsp status from 'http://r3.o.lencr.org' ...
27 ocsp response correctly signed by "C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3"
28 ocsp response is valid: until Jul 27 12:59:58 2022
29certificate status is good
30checking certificate status of "C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3"
31ocsp response verification failed, no signer certificate 'C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3' found
32 fetching crl from 'http://x1.c.lencr.org/' ...
33 using trusted certificate "C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1"
34 crl correctly signed by "C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1"
35 crl is valid: until Apr 18 01:59:59 2023
36certificate status is good
37certificate trusted, lifetimes valid, certificate not revoked
38
39old:
40
41 using certificate "CN=www.strongswan.org"
42 using trusted intermediate ca certificate "C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3"
43checking certificate status of "CN=www.strongswan.org"
44 requesting ocsp status from 'http://r3.o.lencr.org' ...
45 ocsp response correctly signed by "C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3"
46 ocsp response is valid: until Jul 27 12:59:58 2022
47certificate status is good
48 using trusted ca certificate "C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1"
49checking certificate status of "C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3"
50ocsp response verification failed, no signer certificate 'C=US, O=Let's Encrypt, CN=R3' found
51 fetching crl from 'http://x1.c.lencr.org/' ...
52 using trusted certificate "C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1"
53 crl correctly signed by "C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1"
54 crl is valid: until Apr 18 01:59:59 2023
55certificate status is good
56 reached self-signed root ca with a path length of 1
57certificate trusted, lifetimes valid, certificate not revoked
58
59Note that this also fixes an issue with the previous dual-use of the
60`trusted` flag. It not only indicated whether the chain is trusted but
61also whether the current issuer is the root anchor (the corresponding
62flag in the `cert_validator_t` interface is called `anchor`). This was
63a problem when building multi-level trust chains for pre-trusted
64end-entity certificates (i.e. where `trusted` is TRUE from the start).
65This caused the main loop to get aborted after the first intermediate CA
66certificate and the mentioned `anchor` flag wasn't correct in any calls
67to `cert_validator_t` implementations.
68
69Fixes: CVE-2022-40617
70
71CVE: CVE-2022-40617
72Upstream-Status: Backport [https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2022-40617/strongswan-5.1.0-5.9.7_cert_online_validate.patch]
73Signed-off-by: Ranjitsinh Rathod <ranjitsinh.rathod@kpit.com>
74
75---
76 .../credentials/credential_manager.c | 54 +++++++++++++++----
77 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
78
79diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/credential_manager.c b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/credential_manager.c
80index e93b5943a3a7..798785544e41 100644
81--- a/src/libstrongswan/credentials/credential_manager.c
82+++ b/src/libstrongswan/credentials/credential_manager.c
83@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ static void cache_queue(private_credential_manager_t *this)
84 */
85 static bool check_lifetime(private_credential_manager_t *this,
86 certificate_t *cert, char *label,
87- int pathlen, bool trusted, auth_cfg_t *auth)
88+ int pathlen, bool anchor, auth_cfg_t *auth)
89 {
90 time_t not_before, not_after;
91 cert_validator_t *validator;
92@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static bool check_lifetime(private_credential_manager_t *this,
93 continue;
94 }
95 status = validator->check_lifetime(validator, cert,
96- pathlen, trusted, auth);
97+ pathlen, anchor, auth);
98 if (status != NEED_MORE)
99 {
100 break;
101@@ -604,13 +604,13 @@ static bool check_lifetime(private_credential_manager_t *this,
102 */
103 static bool check_certificate(private_credential_manager_t *this,
104 certificate_t *subject, certificate_t *issuer, bool online,
105- int pathlen, bool trusted, auth_cfg_t *auth)
106+ int pathlen, bool anchor, auth_cfg_t *auth)
107 {
108 cert_validator_t *validator;
109 enumerator_t *enumerator;
110
111 if (!check_lifetime(this, subject, "subject", pathlen, FALSE, auth) ||
112- !check_lifetime(this, issuer, "issuer", pathlen + 1, trusted, auth))
113+ !check_lifetime(this, issuer, "issuer", pathlen + 1, anchor, auth))
114 {
115 return FALSE;
116 }
117@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ static bool check_certificate(private_credential_manager_t *this,
118 continue;
119 }
120 if (!validator->validate(validator, subject, issuer,
121- online, pathlen, trusted, auth))
122+ online, pathlen, anchor, auth))
123 {
124 enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
125 return FALSE;
126@@ -726,6 +726,7 @@ static bool verify_trust_chain(private_credential_manager_t *this,
127 auth_cfg_t *auth;
128 signature_params_t *scheme;
129 int pathlen;
130+ bool is_anchor = FALSE;
131
132 auth = auth_cfg_create();
133 get_key_strength(subject, auth);
134@@ -743,7 +744,7 @@ static bool verify_trust_chain(private_credential_manager_t *this,
135 auth->add(auth, AUTH_RULE_CA_CERT, issuer->get_ref(issuer));
136 DBG1(DBG_CFG, " using trusted ca certificate \"%Y\"",
137 issuer->get_subject(issuer));
138- trusted = TRUE;
139+ trusted = is_anchor = TRUE;
140 }
141 else
142 {
143@@ -778,11 +779,18 @@ static bool verify_trust_chain(private_credential_manager_t *this,
144 DBG1(DBG_CFG, " issuer is \"%Y\"",
145 current->get_issuer(current));
146 call_hook(this, CRED_HOOK_NO_ISSUER, current);
147+ if (trusted)
148+ {
149+ DBG1(DBG_CFG, " reached end of incomplete trust chain for "
150+ "trusted certificate \"%Y\"",
151+ subject->get_subject(subject));
152+ }
153 break;
154 }
155 }
156- if (!check_certificate(this, current, issuer, online,
157- pathlen, trusted, auth))
158+ /* don't do online verification here */
159+ if (!check_certificate(this, current, issuer, FALSE,
160+ pathlen, is_anchor, auth))
161 {
162 trusted = FALSE;
163 issuer->destroy(issuer);
164@@ -794,7 +802,7 @@ static bool verify_trust_chain(private_credential_manager_t *this,
165 }
166 current->destroy(current);
167 current = issuer;
168- if (trusted)
169+ if (is_anchor)
170 {
171 DBG1(DBG_CFG, " reached self-signed root ca with a "
172 "path length of %d", pathlen);
173@@ -807,6 +815,34 @@ static bool verify_trust_chain(private_credential_manager_t *this,
174 DBG1(DBG_CFG, "maximum path length of %d exceeded", MAX_TRUST_PATH_LEN);
175 call_hook(this, CRED_HOOK_EXCEEDED_PATH_LEN, subject);
176 }
177+ else if (trusted && online)
178+ {
179+ enumerator_t *enumerator;
180+ auth_rule_t rule;
181+
182+ /* do online revocation checks after basic validation of the chain */
183+ pathlen = 0;
184+ current = subject;
185+ enumerator = auth->create_enumerator(auth);
186+ while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &rule, &issuer))
187+ {
188+ if (rule == AUTH_RULE_CA_CERT || rule == AUTH_RULE_IM_CERT)
189+ {
190+ if (!check_certificate(this, current, issuer, TRUE, pathlen++,
191+ rule == AUTH_RULE_CA_CERT, auth))
192+ {
193+ trusted = FALSE;
194+ break;
195+ }
196+ else if (rule == AUTH_RULE_CA_CERT)
197+ {
198+ break;
199+ }
200+ current = issuer;
201+ }
202+ }
203+ enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
204+ }
205 if (trusted)
206 {
207 result->merge(result, auth, FALSE);
208--
2092.25.1
210
diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb
index 8a5855fb87..c11748645c 100644
--- a/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb
+++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/strongswan/strongswan_5.8.4.bb
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://download.strongswan.org/strongswan-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
14 file://CVE-2021-41990.patch \ 14 file://CVE-2021-41990.patch \
15 file://CVE-2021-41991.patch \ 15 file://CVE-2021-41991.patch \
16 file://CVE-2021-45079.patch \ 16 file://CVE-2021-45079.patch \
17 file://CVE-2022-40617.patch \
17 " 18 "
18 19
19SRC_URI[md5sum] = "0634e7f40591bd3f6770e583c3f27d29" 20SRC_URI[md5sum] = "0634e7f40591bd3f6770e583c3f27d29"
generated by cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf (git 2.39.0) at 2025-11-25 04:54:09 +0000