From 147b663d8340d87084468309c9fd08f30177fd92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hitendra Prajapati Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2023 14:06:53 +0530 Subject: wireshark: Fix CVE-2023-2855 & CVE-2023-2856 Backport fixes for: * CVE-2023-2855 - Upstream-Status: Backport from https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/0181fafb2134a177328443a60b5e29c4ee1041cb * CVE-2023-2856 - Upstream-Status: Backport from https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/db5135826de3a5fdb3618225c2ff02f4207012ca Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster --- .../wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2855.patch | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++ .../wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2856.patch | 69 +++++++++++++ .../recipes-support/wireshark/wireshark_3.4.12.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 179 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2855.patch create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2856.patch (limited to 'meta-networking') diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2855.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2855.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b4718f4607 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2855.patch @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +From 0181fafb2134a177328443a60b5e29c4ee1041cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Guy Harris +Date: Tue, 16 May 2023 12:05:07 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] candump: check for a too-long frame length. + +If the frame length is longer than the maximum, report an error in the +file. + +Fixes #19062, preventing the overflow on a buffer on the stack (assuming +your compiler doesn't call a bounds-checknig version of memcpy() if the +size of the target space is known). + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/0181fafb2134a177328443a60b5e29c4ee1041cb] +CVE: CVE-2023-2855 + +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati +--- + wiretap/candump.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/wiretap/candump.c b/wiretap/candump.c +index 0def7bc..3f7c2b2 100644 +--- a/wiretap/candump.c ++++ b/wiretap/candump.c +@@ -26,8 +26,9 @@ static gboolean candump_seek_read(wtap *wth, gint64 seek_off, + wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, + int *err, gchar **err_info); + +-static void +-candump_write_packet(wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, const msg_t *msg) ++static gboolean ++candump_write_packet(wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, const msg_t *msg, int *err, ++ gchar **err_info) + { + static const char *can_proto_name = "can-hostendian"; + static const char *canfd_proto_name = "canfd"; +@@ -59,6 +60,18 @@ candump_write_packet(wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, const msg_t *msg) + { + canfd_frame_t canfd_frame = {0}; + ++ /* ++ * There's a maximum of CANFD_MAX_DLEN bytes in a CAN-FD frame. ++ */ ++ if (msg->data.length > CANFD_MAX_DLEN) { ++ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE; ++ if (err_info != NULL) { ++ *err_info = g_strdup_printf("candump: File has %u-byte CAN FD packet, bigger than maximum of %u", ++ msg->data.length, CANFD_MAX_DLEN); ++ } ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ + canfd_frame.can_id = msg->id; + canfd_frame.flags = msg->flags; + canfd_frame.len = msg->data.length; +@@ -70,6 +83,18 @@ candump_write_packet(wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, const msg_t *msg) + { + can_frame_t can_frame = {0}; + ++ /* ++ * There's a maximum of CAN_MAX_DLEN bytes in a CAN frame. ++ */ ++ if (msg->data.length > CAN_MAX_DLEN) { ++ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE; ++ if (err_info != NULL) { ++ *err_info = g_strdup_printf("candump: File has %u-byte CAN packet, bigger than maximum of %u", ++ msg->data.length, CAN_MAX_DLEN); ++ } ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ + can_frame.can_id = msg->id; + can_frame.can_dlc = msg->data.length; + memcpy(can_frame.data, msg->data.data, msg->data.length); +@@ -84,6 +109,8 @@ candump_write_packet(wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, const msg_t *msg) + + rec->rec_header.packet_header.caplen = packet_length; + rec->rec_header.packet_header.len = packet_length; ++ ++ return TRUE; + } + + static gboolean +@@ -190,9 +217,7 @@ candump_read(wtap *wth, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_info, + ws_debug_printf("%s: Stopped at offset %" PRIi64 "\n", G_STRFUNC, file_tell(wth->fh)); + #endif + +- candump_write_packet(rec, buf, &msg); +- +- return TRUE; ++ return candump_write_packet(rec, buf, &msg, err, err_info); + } + + static gboolean +@@ -216,9 +241,7 @@ candump_seek_read(wtap *wth , gint64 seek_off, wtap_rec *rec, + if (!candump_parse(wth->random_fh, &msg, NULL, err, err_info)) + return FALSE; + +- candump_write_packet(rec, buf, &msg); +- +- return TRUE; ++ return candump_write_packet(rec, buf, &msg, err, err_info); + } + + /* +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2856.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2856.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..863421f986 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/files/CVE-2023-2856.patch @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +From db5135826de3a5fdb3618225c2ff02f4207012ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Guy Harris +Date: Thu, 18 May 2023 15:03:23 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] vms: fix the search for the packet length field. + +The packet length field is of the form + + Total Length = DDD = ^xXXX + +where "DDD" is the length in decimal and "XXX" is the length in +hexadecimal. + +Search for "length ". not just "Length", as we skip past "Length ", not +just "Length", so if we assume we found "Length " but only found +"Length", we'd skip past the end of the string. + +While we're at it, fail if we don't find a length field, rather than +just blithely acting as if the packet length were zero. + +Fixes #19083. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/db5135826de3a5fdb3618225c2ff02f4207012ca] +CVE: CVE-2023-2856 + +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati +--- + wiretap/vms.c | 9 ++++++++- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/wiretap/vms.c b/wiretap/vms.c +index 0aa83ea..5f5fdbb 100644 +--- a/wiretap/vms.c ++++ b/wiretap/vms.c +@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ parse_vms_packet(FILE_T fh, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_in + { + char line[VMS_LINE_LENGTH + 1]; + int num_items_scanned; ++ gboolean have_pkt_len = FALSE; + guint32 pkt_len = 0; + int pktnum; + int csec = 101; +@@ -374,7 +375,7 @@ parse_vms_packet(FILE_T fh, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_in + return FALSE; + } + } +- if ( (! pkt_len) && (p = strstr(line, "Length"))) { ++ if ( (! have_pkt_len) && (p = strstr(line, "Length "))) { + p += sizeof("Length "); + while (*p && ! g_ascii_isdigit(*p)) + p++; +@@ -390,9 +391,15 @@ parse_vms_packet(FILE_T fh, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_in + *err_info = g_strdup_printf("vms: Length field '%s' not valid", p); + return FALSE; + } ++ have_pkt_len = TRUE; + break; + } + } while (! isdumpline(line)); ++ if (! have_pkt_len) { ++ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE; ++ *err_info = g_strdup_printf("vms: Length field not found"); ++ return FALSE; ++ } + if (pkt_len > WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE_STANDARD) { + /* + * Probably a corrupt capture file; return an error, +-- +2.25.1 + diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/wireshark_3.4.12.bb b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/wireshark_3.4.12.bb index 693a167938..ff99a7508f 100644 --- a/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/wireshark_3.4.12.bb +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/wireshark/wireshark_3.4.12.bb @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ SRC_URI += " \ file://0003-bison-Remove-line-directives.patch \ file://0004-lemon-Remove-line-directives.patch \ file://CVE-2022-3190.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-2855.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-2856.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://1.as.dl.wireshark.org/src" -- cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf