| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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The SRC_URI is changed to git://gitlab.eclipse.org/eclipse/tcf/tcf.agent.git
(From OE-Core rev: d9f424921179a52ffe053411c44f20e44e7deba1)
Signed-off-by: Guocai He <guocai.he.cn@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Below commit on binutils-2.38 stable branch are updated.
9bee8d65d32 x86: Check MODRM for call and jmp in binutils older than 2.45
Before After Diff
No. of expected passes 280 280 0
No. of unexpected failures 2 2 0
No. of untested testcases 1 1 0
No. of unsupported tests 7 7 0
Testing was done and there were no regressions found
(From OE-Core rev: 7ac807166dfb6723f4e0b53c21f434e21d25563e)
Signed-off-by: Deepesh Varatharajan <Deepesh.Varatharajan@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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There are two "new" CVEs reported for python3, their CPEs are:
* CVE-2020-1171: cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:python:*:*:*:*:*:visual_studio_code:*:* (< 2020.5.0)
* CVE-2020-1192: cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:python:*:*:*:*:*:visual_studio_code:*:* (< 2020.5.0)
These are for "Visual Studio Code Python extension".
Solve this by addding CVE vendor to python CVE product to avoid
confusion with Microsoft as vendor.
Examining CVE DB for historical python entries shows:
sqlite> select vendor, product, count(*) from products where product = 'python' or product = 'cpython'
...> or product like 'python%3' group by vendor, product;
microsoft|python|2
python|python|1054
python_software_foundation|python|2
(From OE-Core rev: 06f615e6939a22bc8f12b30d8dea582ab3ccebe6)
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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urllib3 is a user-friendly HTTP client library for Python. Prior to
2.5.0, it is possible to disable redirects for all requests by
instantiating a PoolManager and specifying retries in a way that
disable redirects. By default, requests and botocore users are not
affected. An application attempting to mitigate SSRF or open redirect
vulnerabilities by disabling redirects at the PoolManager level will
remain vulnerable. This issue has been patched in version 2.5.0.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-50181
Upstream patch:
https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/f05b1329126d5be6de501f9d1e3e36738bc08857
(From OE-Core rev: 574146765ea3f9b36532abf4ebc8bd2976396f0b)
Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yogita.urade@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Proxy-Authorization and Proxy-Authenticate headers persisted on
cross-origin redirects potentially leaking sensitive information.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4673
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/golang/go/commit/b897e97c36cb62629a458bc681723ca733404e32
(From OE-Core rev: c07547c19e5372ed5eaac8530b2dd651302542a8)
Signed-off-by: Praveen Kumar <praveen.kumar@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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ctest automatically optimizes the order of (parallel) test execution based on
historic test case runtime via the COST property (see [0]), which can have a
significant impact on overall test run times. Sadly this feature is broken in
CMake < 4.0.0 for test cases that have spaces in their name (see [1]).
This commit is a backport of f24178f3 (which itself backports the upstream fix).
the patch was adapted slightly to apply cleanly to the older CMake version in
kirkstone. As repeated test runs are expected to mainly take place inside the
SDK, the patch is only applied to 'nativesdk' builds.
[0]: https://cmake.org/cmake/help/latest/prop_test/COST.html
[1]: https://gitlab.kitware.com/cmake/cmake/-/issues/26594
Reported-By: John Drouhard <john@drouhard.dev>
(From OE-Core rev: f6a160f7ea57af6dfeca003e6c05aa42419fb755)
Signed-off-by: Moritz Haase <Moritz.Haase@bmw.de>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mathieu.dubois-briand@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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NVD ([1]) tracks this as:
cpe:2.3:a:golang:go:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Running on/with
cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Yocto cve-check ignores the "Running on/with", so it needs to be ignored
explicitly.
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3566
(From OE-Core rev: 571fd82e29fe809c63a5743e534ed7816d787963)
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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In embedded box, sed might be provided another providers like Busybox,
hence use generic options whenever possible.
/bin/sed -> /etc/alternatives/sed
/etc/alternatives/sed -> /bin/busybox.nosuid
Here used 'sed -u' option is not necessary, hence removed it.
Fixes below error:
sed: invalid option -- 'u'
Also added 'set -eux' option which halts execution of the script
on any failures.
(From OE-Core rev: 5b3b290baa0a83f493b7ca25d5ffa5ff279bcc69)
(From OE-Core rev: fe7fa1ec7d005d858ccbdd81eb6f7bfab04b7e46)
Signed-off-by: Aditya Tayade <Aditya.Tayade@kpit.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Badganchi <Pawan.Badganchi@kpit.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mathieu.dubois-briand@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 07caee1829d2a61bc018fe0e37ecd482922179ee)
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
(cherry picked from commit d2da6b5c5668dbc84b905ba2fe4c9b57b580fd82)
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Requests is a HTTP library. Due to a URL parsing issue, Requests
releases prior to 2.32.4 may leak .netrc credentials to third parties
for specific maliciously-crafted URLs. Users should upgrade to version
2.32.4 to receive a fix. For older versions of Requests, use of the
.netrc file can be disabled with `trust_env=False` on one's Requests
Session.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47081
Upstream patch:
https://github.com/psf/requests/commit/96ba401c1296ab1dda74a2365ef36d88f7d144ef
(From OE-Core rev: 37d746033710509ffabc244e0130d20fd81d9673)
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <jiaying.song.cn@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Drop upstreamed patch and refresh remaining patches.
* https://www.python.org/downloads/release/python-31017/
Security content in this release
* gh-131809: Upgrade vendored expat to 2.7.1
* gh-80222: Folding of quoted string in display_name violates RFC
* gh-121284: Invalid RFC 2047 address header after refolding with
email.policy.default
* gh-131261: Update libexpat to 2.7.0
* gh-105704: CVE-2025-0938 urlparse does not flag hostname containing
[ or ] as incorrect
* gh-119511: OOM vulnerability in the imaplib module
* https://www.python.org/downloads/release/python-31018/
Security content in this release
* gh-135034: [CVE 2024-12718] [CVE 2025-4138] [CVE 2025-4330]
[CVE 2025-4435] [CVE 2025-4517] Fixes multiple issues that allowed
tarfile extraction filters (filter="data" and filter="tar") to be
bypassed using crafted symlinks and hard links.
* gh-133767: Fix use-after-free in the “unicode-escape” decoder with a
non-“strict” error handler.
* gh-128840: Short-circuit the processing of long IPv6 addresses early
in ipaddress to prevent excessive memory consumption and a minor
denial-of-service.
gh-133767 got meawhile CVE-2025-4516 assigned.
(From OE-Core rev: 838a8b5ca148dfa6c6c2c76f1705d1e358a31648)
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Upstream-Status: Backport from
https://github.com/git/git/commit/c903985bf7e772e2d08275c1a95c8a55ab011577
&
https://github.com/git/git/commit/7725b8100ffbbff2750ee4d61a0fcc1f53a086e8
& https://github.com/git/git/commit/b01b9b81d36759cdcd07305e78765199e1bc2060
(From OE-Core rev: ed112b58ad0d40bfa36e53a370e964e6a20d694e)
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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PR32858 ld segfault on fuzzed object
We missed one place where it is necessary to check for empty groups.
PR32829, SEGV on objdump function debug_type_samep
u.kenum is always non-NULL, see debug_make_enum_type.
Upstream-Status: Backport
[https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=patch;h=d1458933830456e54223d9fc61f0d9b3a19256f5]
&& [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=patch;h=6c3458a8b7ee7d39f070c7b2350851cb2110c65a]
(From OE-Core rev: 7eb29f802b272dec19c5bfdce93155d99bac918d)
Signed-off-by: Deepesh Varatharajan <Deepesh.Varatharajan@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Upstream-Status: Backport from
https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/d8390feaa99091d1ba9626bec0e4ba7072fc507a
& https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/250a6d17978f9f6ac3ac887091f2d32886fbbb0b
(From OE-Core rev: 6b6e556a226100205427c85e8064f7640a9da25e)
Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Forgot to add CVE-2025-1182 patch file to SRC_URI in the following commit
https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/217350
After rebasing the CVE-2025-1180.patch, we encountered hunk errors while applying the
CVE-2025-1182.patch, so I have modified the patch accordingly.
(From OE-Core rev: 131f93b8efcddac984965a250b5391c43ca54ac8)
Signed-off-by: Harish Sadineni <Harish.Sadineni@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Backporting the fix from PR 32636 to fix PR 32642 (ld SEGV (illegal read access)
in _bfd_elf_write_section_eh_frame (bfd/elf-eh-frame.c:2234:29) with
--gc-sections --gc-keep-exported option)
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1180 is associated with
PR32642 which will get fixed with commit from PR 32636.
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=patch;h=f9978defb6fab0bd8583942d97c112b0932ac814]
CVE: CVE-2025-1180
(From OE-Core rev: 8178f44f18777b2c8acc0afb9fd43921a9a8e76e)
Signed-off-by: Harish Sadineni <Harish.Sadineni@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=patch;h=b425859021d17adf62f06fb904797cf8642986ad]
CVE: CVE-2025-1182
(From OE-Core rev: bbfdd5c44a5629b9158b418b5335ec4f1567b3f9)
Signed-off-by: Harish Sadineni <Harish.Sadineni@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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The cpymemdi/setmemdi implementation doesn't fully support strict alignment.
Block the expansion if the alignment is less than 16 with STRICT_ALIGNMENT.
Clean up the condition when to use MOPS. (PR103100)
The original patch for GCC 12 removed MOPS & SIMD conditionals for setmem and
cpymem expansions in aarch64.md file. However, this version for GCC 11 does not
backport the SIMD & MOPS-related changes and retains the conditions in aarch64.md
file to preserve correctness and compatibility with the GCC 11 backend.
All changes and outputs have been verified by the author.
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gcc.gnu.org/cgit/gcc/commit/?id=b9d16d8361a9e3a82a2f21e759e760d235d43322]
(From OE-Core rev: a99a65632116955dc69809a14bf536b22582de72)
Signed-off-by: Sundeep KOKKONDA <sundeep.kokkonda@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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In the URI gem before 1.0.3 for Ruby, the URI handling methods
(URI.join, URI#merge, URI#+) have an inadvertent leakage of
authentication credentials because userinfo is retained even
after changing the host.
Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-27221
Upstream-patches:
https://github.com/ruby/uri/commit/3675494839112b64d5f082a9068237b277ed1495
https://github.com/ruby/uri/commit/2789182478f42ccbb62197f952eb730e4f02bfc5
(From OE-Core rev: c77ff1288719d90ef257dfe28cb33b3768fc124a)
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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This is needed to properly support memmem() and friends under musl
as musl guards the declarations with _GNU_SOURCE define, and if the
declarations are not present, gcc will issue warnings and generate
assembly that assumes the functions return int (instead of e.g.
void*), with catastrophic consequences at runtime.
(From OE-Core rev: 79dc3f42958bfefe03a8240e2a57501c38d2bd3c)
Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6422e62fbc5c65a2165a72c97c880cfa9a80e957)
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@meraki.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Pick patch mentioned in NVD links for this CVE.
Tested by runniing ptest and CVE reproducer (before&after).
Ptest fails on test dist/threads/t/join, however the same test also
fails without this patch.
(From OE-Core rev: 8e3c821e9ce8f3a9667847a284bc5a6f4973ea13)
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Upstream Repository: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu.git
Bug Details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1386
Type: Security Advisory
CVE: CVE-2023-1386
Score: 3.3
Analysis:
- According to redhat[1] this CVE has closed as not a bug.
Reference:
[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2223985
(From OE-Core rev: 6a5d9e3821246c39ec57fa483802e1bb74fca724)
(From OE-Core rev: f7c8877395d4ec0a91cd5cf54e6c2858495746fb)
Signed-off-by: Madhu Marri <madmarri@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
(Converted to old CVE_CHECK_IGNORE syntax)
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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A vulnerability in the package_index module of pypa/setuptools versions up to 69.1.1
allows for remote code execution via its download functions. These functions, which
are used to download packages from URLs provided by users or retrieved from package
index servers, are susceptible to code injection. If these functions are exposed to
user-controlled inputs, such as package URLs, they can execute arbitrary commands on
the system. The issue is fixed in version 70.0.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6345
https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2024-6345
Upstream patch:
https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/88807c7062788254f654ea8c03427adc859321f0
(From OE-Core rev: 238c305ba2c513a070818de4b6ad4316b54050a7)
Signed-off-by: Soumya Sambu <soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Prevent an abort in the bfd linker when attempting to
generate dynamic relocs for a corrupt input file.
PR 32638
Backport a patch from upstream to fix CVE-2025-1178
Upstream-Status: Backport from [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=patch;h=75086e9de1707281172cc77f178e7949a4414ed0]
(From OE-Core rev: e820e5364c4b3ec52796a77842b480fea8bc7967)
Signed-off-by: Deepesh Varatharajan <Deepesh.Varatharajan@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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REXML is an XML toolkit for Ruby. The REXML gem before 3.3.6 has a DoS
vulnerability when it parses an XML that has many deep elements that have
same local name attributes. If you need to parse untrusted XMLs with tree
parser API like REXML::Document.new, you may be impacted to this vulnerability.
If you use other parser APIs such as stream parser API and SAX2 parser API,
this vulnerability is not affected. The REXML gem 3.3.6 or later include the
patch to fix the vulnerability.
Reference:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2024-43398
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/7cb5eaeb221c322b9912f724183294d8ce96bae3
(From OE-Core rev: f23d1bfca0ea57150c397bc2e495191fb61423d0)
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/golang/go/commit/15e01a2e43ecb8c7e15ff7e9d62fe3f10dcac931
(From OE-Core rev: 2a9f47eb507cf57b58c4aa1baf0ef645b699fd6c)
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Backport a patch from upstream to fix CVE-2024-0151
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/78ff617d3f573fb3a9b2fef180fa0fd43d5584ea]
(From OE-Core rev: 883754a84accdc8f8418e83d3c54aa763bcdff87)
Signed-off-by: Deepesh Varatharajan <Deepesh.Varatharajan@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Fix for this CVE was backported to 5.34.2 in
https://github.com/Perl/perl5/commit/12c313ce49b36160a7ca2e9b07ad5bd92ee4a010
This commit is listed in
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-47038
(From OE-Core rev: 46fd9acd6b0e418009f4cec747ae82af60acbc6b)
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Pick commit mentioned in NDV CVE report
https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/b8b4b713c5f8ec0958c7ef8d29d6711889bc94ab
which is on 3.10 branch.
(From OE-Core rev: 70036b4ea0ab968adab82fc632bb967f95203de2)
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/ruby/cgi/commit/9907b76dad0777ee300de236dad4b559e07596ab]
(From OE-Core rev: 31d67739490ec2abf92328b3f0ceff22ce5d4974)
Signed-off-by: Ashish Sharma <asharma@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/ruby/cgi/commit/cd1eb08076c8b8e310d4d553d427763f2577a1b6
(From OE-Core rev: 44665939783cb2b32f5ade1772e0ceef47f9a853)
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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PR32560 stack-buffer-overflow at objdump disassemble_bytes
Backport a patch from upstream to fix CVE-2025-0840
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commitdiff;h=baac6c221e9d69335bf41366a1c7d87d8ab2f893]
(From OE-Core rev: e12ee4b1713aa25465aa3f866d345d84e9eb948a)
Signed-off-by: Deepesh Varatharajan <Deepesh.Varatharajan@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Backport fixes for:
* CVE-2025-1352 - Upstream-Status: Backport from https://sourceware.org/git/?p=elfutils.git;a=commit;h=2636426a091bd6c6f7f02e49ab20d4cdc6bfc753
* CVE-2025-1372 - Upstream-Status: Backport from https://sourceware.org/git/?p=elfutils.git;a=commit;h=73db9d2021cab9e23fd734b0a76a612d52a6f1db
(From OE-Core rev: 8ea258ad9c83be5d9548a796f7dda4ac820fc435)
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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REXML is an XML toolkit for Ruby. The REXML gem 3.3.2 has a DoS
vulnerability when it parses an XML that has many entity expansions
with SAX2 or pull parser API. The REXML gem 3.3.3 or later include
the patch to fix the vulnerability.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41946
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/033d1909a8f259d5a7c53681bcaf14f13bcf0368
(From OE-Core rev: b0e74fd8922bba8e954a223ec46de5c33d2ff743)
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Reference: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45720
This CVE is relevant only for subversion running on Windows.
(From OE-Core rev: 52cbf6b96952896b16dad34d9eb215fcab88ded2)
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
Reviewed-by: Sofiane Hamam <sofiane.hamam@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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This fixes ptest failures on 32bit architectures
AssertionError:
Failed ptests:
{'python3': ['test_extractall_none_gid',
'test_extractall_none_gname',
'test_extractall_none_mode',
'test_extractall_none_mtime',
'test_extractall_none_uid',
'test_extractall_none_uname',
'setUpClass',
'python3']}
(From OE-Core rev: 838f3cff2a123fb7d5833b6760772ded6efb60bd)
Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 43104b547cb79693c83df0882773ae8dd74b1d35)
Signed-off-by: Haixiao Yan <haixiao.yan.cn@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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The HTTP client drops sensitive headers after following a cross-domain redirect.
For example, a request to a.com/ containing an Authorization header which is redirected to
b.com/ will not send that header to b.com. In the event that the client received a subsequent
same-domain redirect, however, the sensitive headers would be restored. For example, a chain
of redirects from a.com/, to b.com/1, and finally to b.com/2 would incorrectly send the
Authorization header to b.com/2.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45336
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/golang/go/commit/b72d56f98d6620ebe07626dca4bb67ea8e185379
(From OE-Core rev: 63e84b64f055ad7c91de67194e6739c96fb95496)
Signed-off-by: Praveen Kumar <praveen.kumar@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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CVE: CVE-2024-53589
(From OE-Core rev: 4ddd1e5aea1c4b84a6c4e1db5ded4938c4a35393)
Signed-off-by: Yash Shinde <Yash.Shinde@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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CVE: CVE-2024-53589
(From OE-Core rev: 2d6df18f4a694d6499b337bbbab10ba8bb6e3fe4)
Signed-off-by: Yash Shinde <Yash.Shinde@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Using the package architecture to select the right qemu options to pass
to qemu-user is incorrect, and fails for recipes that set PACKAGE_ARCH
to MACHINE_ARCH (as the qemuppc workarounds suggest) because there are
not typically any options set for the machine name.
Solve this by using TUNE_PKGARCH instead: for the majority of recipes
this is the same value, but for machine-specific recipes it remains the
same instead of changing to the machine name.
This means we can remove the qemuppc workarounds, as they're obsolete.
Also update the gcc-testsuite recipe which uses the same pattern to use
TUNE_PKGARCH, and generalise the else codepath to avoid needing to
update the list of architectures.
[ YOCTO #15647 ]
(From OE-Core rev: 077aab43f2c928eb8da71934405c62327010f552)
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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A flaw was found in rsync. This vulnerability arises from a race condition during
rsync's handling of symbolic links. Rsync's default behavior when encountering
symbolic links is to skip them. If an attacker replaced a regular file with a
symbolic link at the right time, it was possible to bypass the default behavior
and traverse symbolic links. Depending on the privileges of the rsync process,
an attacker could leak sensitive information, potentially leading to privilege escalation.
(From OE-Core rev: c0905ffb2f1aa3bc4c6187ff4860dcc8d3dbfb01)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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A flaw was found in rsync. When using the `--safe-links` option, rsync fails to
properly verify if a symbolic link destination contains another symbolic link within it.
This results in a path traversal vulnerability, which may lead to arbitrary file write
outside the desired directory
(From OE-Core rev: 741200c41a19ef5b4876d9a80667dfde2e5f4a9d)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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A path traversal vulnerability exists in rsync. It stems from behavior enabled
by the `--inc-recursive` option, a default-enabled option for many client options
and can be enabled by the server even if not explicitly enabled by the client.
When using the `--inc-recursive` option, a lack of proper symlink verification
coupled with deduplication checks occurring on a per-file-list basis could allow
a server to write files outside of the client's intended destination directory.
A malicious server could write malicious files to arbitrary locations named after
valid directories/paths on the client.
(From OE-Core rev: 12328df8dfcdc73ef70af299e9ebdc1d8ae73f37)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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A flaw was found in rsync. It could allow a server to enumerate the contents of an
arbitrary file from the client's machine. This issue occurs when files are being
copied from a client to a server. During this process, the rsync server will send
checksums of local data to the client to compare with in order to determine what
data needs to be sent to the server. By sending specially constructed checksum values
for arbitrary files, an attacker may be able to reconstruct the data of those files
byte-by-byte based on the responses from the client.
(From OE-Core rev: b49c8f58c20d7deb354a86a34488cb798c49eba3)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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A flaw was found in the rsync daemon which could be triggered when rsync compares
file checksums. This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate the checksum length
(s2length) to cause a comparison between a checksum and uninitialized memory and
leak one byte of uninitialized stack data at a time.
(From OE-Core rev: 3fd8bea3e72573cca03cd3f6f4fc077cd2fd45a3)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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A heap-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the rsync daemon. This issue is due
to improper handling of attacker-controlled checksum lengths (s2length) in the code.
When MAX_DIGEST_LEN exceeds the fixed SUM_LENGTH (16 bytes), an attacker can write
out of bounds in the sum2 buffer.
(From OE-Core rev: 17fac276e27af19b00b6263f22156a55bae6a5c9)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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It has been fixed by removing the check upstream see
https://github.com/WayneD/rsync/commit/9a3449a3980421f84ac55498ba565bc112b20d6c
(From OE-Core rev: c6228b8371ea5c3c452db7b536948ae96d83844b)
(From OE-Core rev: 3746c60f38a6cf99f293131b8b1bfed7c73a1944)
Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Rebase patches.
(From OE-Core rev: 827c787893caa973c509acf7cac9e17fec5692a4)
(From OE-Core rev: 798009f46f2044aaa0bac753430cca1964677741)
Signed-off-by: Alexander Kanavin <alex@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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REXML is an XML toolkit for Ruby. The REXML gem before 3.3.9 has a ReDoS
vulnerability when it parses an XML that has many digits between &# and x...;
in a hex numeric character reference (&#x.... This does not happen with
Ruby 3.2 or later. Ruby 3.1 is the only affected maintained Ruby.
The REXML gem 3.3.9 or later include the patch to fix the vulnerability.
CVE-2024-49761-0009.patch is the CVE fix and rest are dependent commits.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49761
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/810d2285235d5501a0a124f300832e6e9515da3c
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/83ca5c4b0f76cf7b307dd1be1dc934e1e8199863
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/51217dbcc64ecc34aa70f126b103bedf07e153fc
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/7e4049f6a68c99c4efec2df117057ee080680c9f
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/fc6cad570b849692a28f26a963ceb58edc282bbc
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/77128555476cb0db798e2912fb3a07d6411dc320
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/370666e314816b57ecd5878e757224c3b6bc93f5
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/a579730f25ec7443796495541ec57c071b91805d
https://github.com/ruby/rexml/commit/ce59f2eb1aeb371fe1643414f06618dbe031979f
(From OE-Core rev: 5b453400e9dd878b81b1447d14b3f518809de17e)
Signed-off-by: Divya Chellam <divya.chellam@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Calling Parse on a "// +build" build tag line with deeply nested
expressions can cause a panic due to stack exhaustion.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34158
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/golang/go/commit/d4c53812e6ce2ac368173d7fcd31d0ecfcffb002
(From OE-Core rev: eb14e9722d023b4d1668c55ce4bc6ef02f8ce6c2)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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Calling Decoder.Decode on a message which contains deeply nested structures can
cause a panic due to stack exhaustion. This is a follow-up to CVE-2022-30635.
Reference:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34156
Upstream-patch:
https://github.com/golang/go/commit/2092294f2b097c5828f4eace6c98a322c1510b01
(From OE-Core rev: 3aeeee86a53cee14bb1a6a485f8781459b6f2ffc)
Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <archana.polampalli@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
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