| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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This vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2014-6271, CVE-2014-7169, and CVE-2014-6277
See: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-6278
(From OE-Core daisy rev: de596b5f31e837dcd2ce991245eb5548f12d72ae)
(From OE-Core rev: 32e6864323cf2e4405b835cf474bcdf6fd572961)
Signed-off-by: Catalin Popeanga <Catalin.Popeanga@enea.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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Follow up bash42-049 to parse properly function definitions in the
values of environment variables, to not allow remote attackers to
execute arbitrary code or to cause a denial of service.
See: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-6277
(From OE-Core daisy rev: 85961bcf81650992259cebb0ef1f1c6cdef3fefa)
(From OE-Core rev: ae653aed4c6b7d8075cd464edcd2e01237bfc105)
Signed-off-by: Catalin Popeanga <Catalin.Popeanga@enea.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is a followup patch to incomplete CVE-2014-6271 fix code execution via
specially-crafted environment
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-7186
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-7187
(From OE-Core daisy rev: 153d1125659df9e5c09e35a58bd51be184cb13c1)
(From OE-Core rev: 32818a104ae99a5795d91a2960d48d433d542dee)
Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is a followup patch to incomplete CVE-2014-6271 fix code execution via
specially-crafted environment
This patch changes the encoding bash uses for exported functions to avoid
clashes with shell variables and to avoid depending only on an environment
variable's contents to determine whether or not to interpret it as a shell
function.
(From OE-Core daisy rev: 6c51cc96d03df26d1c10867633e7a10dfbec7c45)
(From OE-Core rev: 998cd2c6dd3709ae0d47c845dff227680bda96f5)
Signed-off-by: Sona Sarmadi <sona.sarmadi@enea.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is a followup patch to incomplete CVE-2014-6271 fix
code execution via specially-crafted environment
Change-Id: Ibb0a587ee6e09b8174e92d005356e822ad40d4ed
(From OE-Core master rev: 76a2d6b83472995edbe967aed80f0fcbb784b3fc)
(From OE-Core rev: 59e7817b6e1d1dd90668083cf34f1650a84430c0)
Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Robert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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CVE-2014-6271 aka ShellShock.
"GNU Bash through 4.3 processes trailing strings after function definitions in
the values of environment variables, which allows remote attackers to execute
arbitrary code via a crafted environment."
(From OE-Core master rev: 798d833c9d4bd9ab287fa86b85b4d5f128170ed3)
(From OE-Core rev: d57b9ce8bb97f88c329da973c3567d04d8eb07d2)
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Robert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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(From OE-Core rev: 71e07ce8d1e4c2a50e937f0c819f025afd4677cb)
Signed-off-by: Björn Stenberg <bjst@enea.com>
Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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On hosts with FORTIFY_SOURCES, stringize support is required, as it's used by
the macros to wrap functions (e.g. read and open in unistd.h). Those wrappers
use the STRING() macro from unistd.h. A header in the bash sources overrides
the unistd.h macro to 'x' when HAVE_STRINGIZE is not defined, causing the
wrappers to generate calls to 'xread' and 'xopen', which do not exist,
resulting in a failure to link.
Assume we have stringize support when cross-compiling, which works around the
issue.
It may be best for upstream to either give up on supporting compilers without
stringize support, or to not define STRING() at all when FORTIFY_SOURCES is
defined, letting the unistd.h one be used, instead.
(From OE-Core rev: f7a25dd72d1d463eb72d48c6f9dd968d376496c0)
Signed-off-by: Christopher Larson <chris_larson@mentor.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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(From OE-Core rev: 0eb139619301d0efee330932eba3617dcb39284e)
Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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(From OE-Core rev: cd3d74f88b950050ee1e7738287b8752e8c7b711)
Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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