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From 21542545990c5aba4b919ac0f8c8ae6a408b49d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 23 May 2018 11:31:03 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] ext4: correctly handle a zero-length xattr with a non-zero
 e_value_offs

commit 8a2b307c21d4b290e3cbe33f768f194286d07c23 upstream.

Ext4 will always create ext4 extended attributes which do not have a
value (where e_value_size is zero) with e_value_offs set to zero.  In
most places e_value_offs will not be used in a substantive way if
e_value_size is zero.

There was one exception to this, which is in ext4_xattr_set_entry(),
where if there is a maliciously crafted file system where there is an
extended attribute with e_value_offs is non-zero and e_value_size is
0, the attempt to remove this xattr will result in a negative value
getting passed to memmove, leading to the following sadness:

[   41.225365] EXT4-fs (loop0): mounted filesystem with ordered data mode. Opts: (null)
[   44.538641] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff9ec9a3000000
[   44.538733] IP: __memmove+0x81/0x1a0
[   44.538755] PGD 1249bd067 P4D 1249bd067 PUD 1249c1067 PMD 80000001230000e1
[   44.538793] Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP PTI
[   44.539074] CPU: 0 PID: 1470 Comm: poc Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1+ #1
    ...
[   44.539475] Call Trace:
[   44.539832]  ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x9e7/0xf80
    ...
[   44.539972]  ext4_xattr_block_set+0x212/0xea0
    ...
[   44.540041]  ext4_xattr_set_handle+0x514/0x610
[   44.540065]  ext4_xattr_set+0x7f/0x120
[   44.540090]  __vfs_removexattr+0x4d/0x60
[   44.540112]  vfs_removexattr+0x75/0xe0
[   44.540132]  removexattr+0x4d/0x80
    ...
[   44.540279]  path_removexattr+0x91/0xb0
[   44.540300]  SyS_removexattr+0xf/0x20
[   44.540322]  do_syscall_64+0x71/0x120
[   44.540344]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x21/0x86

https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199347

This addresses CVE-2018-10840.

CVE: CVE-2018-10840
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=linux-4.14.y&id=21542545990c5aba4b919ac0f8c8ae6a408b49d4]

Reported-by: "Xu, Wen" <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: dec214d00e0d7 ("ext4: xattr inode deduplication")
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Wellving <andreas.wellving@enea.com>
---
 fs/ext4/xattr.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
index 1718354e6322..ed1cf24a7831 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
@@ -1687,7 +1687,7 @@ static int ext4_xattr_set_entry(struct ext4_xattr_info *i,
 
 	/* No failures allowed past this point. */
 
-	if (!s->not_found && here->e_value_offs) {
+	if (!s->not_found && here->e_value_size && here->e_value_offs) {
 		/* Remove the old value. */
 		void *first_val = s->base + min_offs;
 		size_t offs = le16_to_cpu(here->e_value_offs);
-- 
2.20.1